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I. Whether student speech outside the school setting is governed by Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 504 (1969) and its progeny? 
 
II. If so, whether application of the Tinker standard and its progeny allow petitioner’s 
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 The opinions of the District and Appeals Courts have not been reported but appear in the 
record. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are 
reviewed for clear error.  Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.  
 
JURISDICTION 
 The court of appeals entered judgment on September 30, 2010.  R. 20.  Petitioner filed his 
petition for writ of certiorari on December 30, 2010.  R. 21.  This Court granted the petition on 
June 7, 2011.  R. 22.  This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.  







STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Factual Background 
This case arose after Murano High School student Michael Fernando created a Facebook 
page to protest the hiring of a teacher at the school.  Entitled “Murano is Anti-Gay,” the webpage 
was designed to draw attention to a recently hired teacher that writes an anti-LGBT blog.  R. 2.   
The membership was made up entirely of Murano students, who quickly began posting links, 
photos, drawings, and comments on the page.  R. 15.   
Though the webpage was created off-campus, it came to the attention of school officials 
when a teacher found a printout from the website depicting school administrators in sexually 
explicit drawings.  R. 15.  In addition, concerned parents and students began complaining about 
the offensive content on the page, while teachers complained that they were having a difficult 
time controlling their classrooms because students were constantly discussing the website.  R. 2.  
Administrators at Murano High School asked Fernando to remove the offensive material from 
the page.  R. 15.  Fernando refused and was suspended until he removes the offensive content.  
R. 15.   
B. Procedural Background 
Fernando brought a § 1983 claim against the school claiming a violation of his free speech 
rights, and moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the school from continuing his 
suspension.  R. 15.  The district court denied Fernando’s motion finding that the school properly 
suspended him.  The court applied Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 
determining that the school could regulate the speech because it caused a substantial disruption.  
R. 16.   
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Fernando appealed the judgment of the district court, but it was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals for the same reasons given by the district court.  R. 20.  This Court granted certiorari to 
review the issues presented.  R. 21. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. 
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that students have free speech rights, though 
they are not coextensive with the rights of adults.  In the school setting, it is important that school 
officials have the authority to regulate student speech that disrupts schoolwork.  The Supreme 
Court has applied this rule to speech that occurs on school grounds; however, with advances in 
technology, speech that occurs off-campus can have a disruptive impact on-campus.  Though the 
speech does not originate on school grounds, school authorities should be allowed to regulate the 
student speech because of its disruptive effects on the school.  The same tests created by the 
Supreme Court to determine when school authorities can regulate on-campus speech also apply 
to speech that occurs off-campus. 
II. 
The school properly regulated Fernando’s speech because it did cause a material and 
substantial disruption with the work and discipline of the school.  Fernando’s speech was 
disruptive because it undermined the authority of school, distracted students from their 
schoolwork, and diverted the time and resources of the school to managing the growing 
disruption.  This disruption was substantial enough to warrant Fernando’s suspension until he 
removes the offensive content from the webpage.  Additionally, pursuant to Tinker, school 






I. STUDENT SPEECH OUTSIDE THE SCHOOL SETTING IS GOVERNED BY 
TINKER BECAUSE THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE IDENTIFIED IN TINKER IS A 
FLEXIBLE CONCEPT. 
 
Student speech that occurs off-campus falls under the Tinker standard because the 
schoolhouse gate is no longer a rigid concept.  Advances in technology have made defining 
school boundaries by the physical perimeter of the school impractical.  School officials can use 
Tinker to regulate speech that negatively impacts the school despite the fact that the speech may 
have been initiated off-campus. 
Tinker and its Progeny 
The foundational student free speech case is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, where the United States Supreme Court ruled that on-campus student speech is 
protected under the First Amendment.  393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).  However, the Court 
recognized that schools also have a legitimate interest in maintaining a disciplined environment 
conducive to learning.  Id. at 507.  Thus, the Tinker Court held that school authorities may 
regulate on-campus student speech if it causes a “material and substantial interference” with the 
order and discipline of the school.  Id. at 511.  The Court further held that the school need not 
wait for a disturbance to occur, but may regulate speech if school authorities can reasonably 
“forecast” that the speech will cause a “substantial disruption” with school activities.  Id. at 514.   
Tinker creates a balancing test, weighing the academic concerns of the school with the free 
speech rights of students.  See id. at 511. 
Similarly, Tinker’s progeny employs the balancing test, expanding the scope of Tinker to 
more areas where a school can legitimately regulate or prohibit student speech.  In all of these 
cases the Court held that the school need not show a material and substantial disruption, as 
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required in Tinker.  In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court held that school 
authorities can prohibit speech that is “lewd, indecent, or offensive.”  478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) 
(holding that school legitimately disciplined student for delivering sexually explicit speech at 
school assembly).  Regulation is proper because of the societal interest in teaching students the 
“boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”  Id. at 681.  Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier recognizes the right of schools to regulate school-sponsored speech when the 
regulation is related to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding 
that school’s editorial control over student newspaper did not violate student free speech).  
Finally, the most recent student free speech case from the Supreme Court is Morse v. Frederick. 
551 U.S. 393 (2007).  In Morse, the Court allowed the school to discipline a student for speech 
that occurred outside the school, at a school-sanctioned event, because it promoted illegal drug 
use.  Id. at 397.  The Morse Court recognized that school authority may extend beyond the 
school campus.  In sum, Tinker and its progeny allow the school to regulate speech if it causes a 
material and substantial disruption, if it is lewd, if it encourages illegal drug use, or if it is 
school-sponsored.  More importantly, these cases establish a balancing test to weigh the interests 
of maintaining a well-order school, while respecting students’ free speech rights.   
The Concept of the Schoolhouse Gate 
The concept of the schoolhouse gate was first described in Tinker, where the Court held that 
students do not “shed their constitutional rights” once they enter “the schoolhouse gate.”  Tinker, 
393 U.S. at 506.  Though seemingly a fixed concept, the schoolhouse gate has necessarily 
become more flexible with technological advances.  Many lower courts recognize that the 
schoolhouse gate is no longer constructed only of “the bricks and mortar” that make up the 
physical boundaries of the school.  Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 
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2011).  The overwhelming presence of cell phones, the ease of access to the internet, and the 
constant social networking via websites like Facebook allow speech to be “everywhere at once.”  
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011).  As a result an 
effort to define the boundaries of student free speech by the actual physical boundaries of a 
campus is “a recipe for serious problems” for schools.  Layshock, 650 F.3d at 221.   
The problems with a rigid concept of the schoolhouse gate are well-illustrated by the case at 
bar.  Fernando’s speech, though it was initiated off-campus, rapidly spread to the school through 
the social networking mediums.  Once student speech is public, especially if it is directed at or is 
about the school, the physical boundaries of the campus are no longer a useful tool for 
determining whether or not the school has the authority to regulate it.  Technology has blurred 
the concept of the schoolhouse gate, and school officials must be able to act accordingly.   
The Tinker Balancing Test 
Tinker establishes a balancing test that helps weigh the competing interests of the school 
district’s need to maintain a well-ordered school environment with the constitutional right to free 
speech.  While acknowledging students’ First Amendment rights, it also allows schools the 
freedom to regulate speech in order to maintain the proper learning environment.  In Tinker the 
Court emphasized that the school can regulate or prohibit speech that “materially disrupts 
classwork.”  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.  Tinker’s progeny employs this balancing test.  Fraser 
recognizes that “freedom to advocate unpopular… views” needs to be “balanced against… 
society’s countervailing interest” in educating students on the “boundaries of socially appropriate 
behavior.”  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.  Hazelwood describes the “legitimate pedagogical concerns” 
of the school that can justify control over “school-sponsored expressive activities.”  Hazelwood, 
484 U.S. at 273.   
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Whether acknowledging an application of Tinker’s balancing test or not, the circuit courts do 
engage in weighing of interests in deciding whether student speech can be regulated by the 
school.  For instance, in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools the court grants that the school’s 
concern in preventing the bullying and harassment of its students is superior to a student’s free 
speech that occurs off-campus because school officials are the “trustees of the student body.”  
652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011).  The Layshock court stated that any student First Amendment 
inquiry must also consider the distinctive “nature of the school environment.”  Layshock, 650 
F.3d at 212.  The concurring opinion in Layshock makes it clear that the real analysis in a student 
free speech case is not where the speech initially occurred, but about “how to balance the need” 
for a well-ordered school environment with “respect for free speech.”  Id. at 221 (Jordan, J., 
concurring).   
These cases demonstrate that Tinker is not about where the speech occurred.  Tinker is about 
providing courts with a balancing test with which to weigh the important right to free speech 
against the important need to maintain order in schools.  A limitation on the school’s ability to 
discipline a student merely because his or her highly disruptive speech was initiated off-campus 
cannot be tolerated.  Layshock, 650 F.3d at 221 (Jordan, J., concurring) (recognizing that reliance 
on physical property lines is insufficient for purposes of disciplining student that engages in 
disruptive speech).  Tinker and its progeny do not impose rigid limits on the school and its ability 
to regulate student speech; rather they allow schools the freedom to continue to ensure the well-
being of the student body by permitting regulation of speech that disrupts schoolwork. 
Quality and Quantity of Contacts with the School 
Speech that technically occurs off-campus can quickly become on-campus speech.  When 
this happens it can reasonably be perceived as on-campus speech, regardless of where it was 
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initiated, such that the school can justify its regulation.  This can be seen in circuit cases.  For 
instance, in Boucher v. School Board of the School District of Greenfield a student was 
disciplined for contributing an article to an underground newspaper that gave step-by-step 
instructions on how to hack into the school’s computers.  134 F.3d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 1998).  The 
article was written at home and distributed on-campus, but its physical presence on the campus 
was not the sole reason the school was able to punish Boucher.  The court found that since the 
article was distributed on campus, was directed to the student body and called for “on-campus 
activity,” the school was justified in interpreting it as in-school speech.  Id. at 829.  Thus the 
court had no issue with applying a Tinker analysis to the facts of that case. 
Another example of off-campus speech that became on-campus speech is LaVine v. Blaine 
School District, where a student showed his English teacher a poem with violent imagery, 
including shooting other students and suicide.  257 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2000).  Against the 
backdrop of a recent spree of school shootings combined with some past disciplinary problems 
with the student poet, the court ruled that it was reasonable for school officials to perceive it as a 
threat to the school.  Id. at 990.  Because the poem was brought on-campus and could reasonably 
be perceived as being directed at the school, the court easily applied Tinker.  Id. at 989.  
In contrast, when the speech’s contact with the school is minimal and is not directed at the 
school, the courts decline to allow the speech’s regulation.  For example, in Porter v.  Ascension 
Parish School Board the court held that a student drawing depicting the school under siege could 
not be regulated by the school because it did not constitute “student speech on… school 
premises.” 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004).  Though the speech made its way onto campus, it 
did not do so in a meaningful way.  Id.  The drawing, which was two years old, was 
inadvertently brought to a middle school by Porter’s younger brother where it came to the 
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attention of school officials.  Id. at 611.  Since it was never meant to be seen by anyone other 
than his family, the court did not find that it was directed at the school such that it could justify 
the disciplinary measures imposed on Porter.  Id. at 615.   
Another case that demonstrates that the contacts with the school must be meaningful is 
Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School District.  607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).   
In this case, students were disciplined after their underground newspaper was discovered by 
school authorities.  Id. at 1045.  The newspaper was actually stored on-campus, some of it was 
compiled on campus, and one teacher even provided assistance on “questions of grammar and 
content.”  Id. at 1045.  However, the court found that the contacts with the school were “de 
minimis.”  Id. at 1050.  The court noted that the students made every effort to ensure that the 
newspaper did not have an impact on campus.  Id.  The content, though vulgar, was not directed 
at the school, they took care to make sure it was distributed only off-campus, and almost all the 
work for the paper was done off-campus.  Id.  The court held that Tinker did not apply and the 
school’s regulation of the newspaper was unreasonable.  Id.  However, even the Thomas court 
recognized that there may be some situations where speech from a “remote locale” “incites 
substantial disruption.”  Id. at 1052.  In such circumstances, regulation would be permissible.  Id. 
The important thread that runs through these cases is that the schoolhouse gate is a flexible 
concept.  Most courts do apply Tinker to weigh the competing interests of the schools and the 
students.  Cases where the courts do not defer to the judgments of the school district, such as 
Thomas or Porter, are anomalies.  Though some of the circuit court opinions describe Orwellian 
scenarios where the school can punish a student for making a rude comment about a school 
official at a private party, the above cases demonstrate that only certain kinds of speech will fall 
under the school’s authority to regulate.  J.S., 650 F.3d at 933.  If the speech is directed at the 
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school or “could reasonably be expected” to have an impact at the school, then it falls under 
Tinker.  Kowalski 652 F.3d at 573.  On the other hand, speech that is carefully calculated to 
remain outside the school will not be subject to the school’s authority.  The worst-case scenarios 
described by some courts envisioning the school’s ability to reach into students’ homes are 
unfounded.  Using the Tinker standards, courts are perfectly capable of distinguishing the speech 
that, by its impact on the campus, is subject to school regulation.   
Fernando’s speech could reasonably be construed as meant to reach the school.  The 
webpage being titled “Murano is Anti-Gay” is very clearly directed at the school.  R. 2.  
Furthermore, all the contributors to the page were students at Murano High School.  Id.  It was 
thus quite foreseeable that the speech would reach and impact the school; explicit drawings did 
in fact make their way to campus. R. 15.  Since the speech was about the school, directed at the 
school and its students, and did make it to campus, there exists a “nexus” that is “sufficiently 
strong to justify” its regulation.  See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573.   
Tinker and its progeny can apply to student speech that occurs both on and off campus 
because Tinker’s essential holding is the creation of a balancing test.  Even as technology 
advances and the on/off-campus boundaries become increasingly blurred, school officials will 
still have a way to maintain order and discipline in their schools.  Speech that was initiated off-
campus can be regulated when it reaches and impacts the school in a meaningful way.  Speech 
that is directed at, or could be expected to reach, the school can therefore fall under the 
legitimate regulations of the school.  Fernando’s speech was initiated off-campus, but it was so 
connected with the school that application of Tinker and its progeny is appropriate.   
II. APPLICATION OF TINKER AND ITS PROGENY ALLOW PETITIONER’S 
SPEECH TO BE REGULATED BECAUSE THE SPEECH CAUSED A 
MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION, AND BECAUSE SCHOOL 




The school district is justified in regulating Fernando’s speech because Tinker and its 
progeny allow school officials to prohibit speech that interferes with the work and discipline of 
the school.  Furthermore, Tinker allows the schools to regulate speech if they can reasonably 
forecast that the speech will cause disruption if unregulated.  Because Fernando’s speech caused 
a material and substantial disruption, and school officials could reasonably anticipate more 
disruption, Murano was justified in suspending Fernando until he removes the offensive content.  
School Properly Regulated Speech because it Caused Disruption 
While students undoubtedly have a right to free speech, the Tinker court recognized that this 
right is limited.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).  The 
Court stated that speech that “materially disrupts classwork” is “not immunized” by the First 
Amendment.  Id. at 513.  Though this is central to the holding in Tinker, the Court does not 
define what constitutes a material and substantial disruption.  Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 
461 F.3d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 2006).  Furthermore, no real consensus exists among the circuit 
courts on what is meant by a material and substantial disruption. 
The Tinker Court itself was in disagreement about what constituted a material and substantial 
disruption.  The majority held that although the black armbands did cause hostile comments, 
warnings, and a dispute in a math class, there was “no indication” that schoolwork was 
“disrupted.”  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.  However, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Black argued 
that the disruption was substantial enough to warrant the speech’s regulation.  Id. at 515 (Black, 
J., dissenting).  Justice Black pointed out that that the mere absence of “boisterous and loud 
disorder” is not indicative that there was absolutely no disruption.  Id. at 518.  He explained that 
the protest “did divert students’ minds” from their schoolwork.  Id.  Further, Black argued that 
the majority’s holding opened up the door for more disruption because students “will be… able 
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and willing” to “defy their teachers.”  Id. at 525.  The lack of consensus on what constitutes a 
material and substantial disruption is further played out in the circuit courts.   
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District is another example of a court in 
disagreement about the definition of material and substantial disruption.  650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 
2011).  The J.S. court held that the school could not punish a student for creating a derogatory 
profile about her school principal because “no disruptions occurred.”  Id. at 929.  However, six 
dissenting judges found that this conclusion was erroneous because the majority failed to take 
into account the seriousness of the misconduct.  Id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).  The dissenters 
argued that J.S.’s conduct was disruptive because it undermined school authority, disrupted the 
classroom environment and impaired the ability of teachers to effectively perform their job 
functions.  Id. at 945.  Like Justice Black in Tinker, the J.S. dissenters also conclude that had J.S. 
not been punished, it was foreseeable that more students would be encouraged to “personally 
attack” the principal and other school officials.  Id. at 947.   
Other courts impose a more lenient standard on the schools in determining what constitutes 
disruption.  For example, in Doninger v. Niehoff, a student was disqualified from running for 
senior class secretary after posting lewd and misleading information on her blog about the school 
administration.  527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 
2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).  The school argued that there was sufficient disruption 
to justify the disciplinary measure because the language encouraged many to flood the school 
administration with calls and emails, it diverted school resources from their “core educational 
responsibilities” by calling on administrators to manage the growing anger of the student body, 
and it caused school officials to “miss or be late” to school functions.  Id. at 51.  The court found 
that this was enough to constitute a material and substantial disruption.  Id.   
12 
 
The Doninger court also recognized that the student’s conduct risked “frustration of the 
proper operation” of the student government, and that it undermined the “values that student 
government” is supposed to promote.  Id. at 52.  This, the court found, created substantial 
disruption because Doninger’s conduct was a violation of the school policy of “civility and 
cooperative conflict resolution.”  Id.  Thus, undermining school policy and school authority can 
qualify as substantial disruption.  Id.  The Doninger court points to a similar case, Lowery v. 
Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007), to suggest that it is not alone in holding that an 
undermining of school authority constitutes substantial disruption.  Id.  In Lowery a football team 
circulated a petition designed to get their coach, Euverard, fired.  Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585.  The 
court found that this conduct created substantial disruption because attacking the coach’s 
authority “necessarily undermin[ed] his ability” to be an effective leader.  Id. at 594.  The 
Lowery court also provided a hypothetical example, where a student is disciplined for making a 
“smart aleck” comment to a teacher.  Id.  Though the teacher would have a difficult time proving 
that this specific incident disrupted school activities, the court noted that allowing this incident to 
go unpunished would “clearly negatively affect” the overall ability of a school to “maintain order 
and discipline.”  Id.  The court concluded that signing a petition designed to fire the football 
coach was tantamount to a declaration of disrespect for this school official.  Id.  Finally, the court 
noted that while the players were free to continue “their campaign” to have the coach fired, they 
were not free to “continue to play football” while “actively working to undermine” the coach’s 
authority.  Id. at 600. 
Doninger and Lowery are pertinent to analyzing Fernando’s speech because both courts 
recognize that undermining school authority is a disruption in itself.  See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 
52; Lowery, 584 F.3d at 594.  Speech that undermines school authority encourages other students 
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to act similarly.  J.S. 650 F.3d at 945 (Fisher, J., dissenting).  If Fernando were not disciplined it 
would “demonstrate to the student body” that this sort of offensive speech is “acceptable 
behavior.”  Id.  As Justice Black points out in his Tinker dissent, the Constitution does not 
compel school officials to “surrender control” of public schools to its students.  Tinker, 393 U.S. 
at 526 (Black, J., dissenting).  A policy that requires school officials to tolerate the conduct 
engaged in by Fernando and his fellow students would amount to just this.  In sum, the school 
was justified in regulating Fernando’s speech because it caused a material and substantial 
disruption by undermining school authority. 
Finally, the disruption caused by Fernando’s speech went beyond undermining school 
authority.  The website did materially interfere with daily school activities.  There is evidence 
that the webpage was frequently accessed and discussed on school grounds during school hours, 
and because of this, students were quite distracted from their school work.  R. 2.  Additionally, 
numerous complaints from teachers, parents, and students diverted school resources to manage 
the growing discontent.  R. 17.  Many courts would find that these facts constitute sufficient 
disruption to justify disciplinary actions against the student whose speech caused the trouble.  
See J.S., 650 F.3d at 944 (Fisher, J., dissenting); Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51    
School Could Reasonably Forecast Substantial Disruption 
Even assuming arguendo that Fernando’s speech did not cause sufficient disruption to 
warrant his suspension, school officials were still justified in their actions because Tinker allows 
schools to regulate speech when they can reasonably forecast that the speech will cause 
disruption.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.  Murano High School officials could reasonably forecast 
that Fernando’s speech would cause more disruption because of the problems that had already 
occurred at the school. 
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Tinker does not require that school officials wait for disruption to occur before they may take 
action.  Id. at 513.  When the school can point to facts that might “reasonably have led” school 
officials to “forecast substantial disruption,” the school may regulate that speech, regardless of 
whether any disruption has actually occurred.  Id. at 514.  Moreover, “Tinker does not require 
certainty” that disruption will occur; it simply requires that the forecast of disruption be 
“reasonable.”  Lowery, 497 F.3d at 592.  In the present case, Murano officials can point to 
specific facts that led them to reasonably forecast disruption.  Therefore they were justified in 
suspending Fernando. 
Tinker suggests that a forecast is reasonable when the school’s decision is based on the facts 
surrounding the speech that “might reasonably portend disruption.” LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989.  
Lower courts have recognized that evidence of past disruption can “support an inference” of 
disruption in the future.  Boucher, 134 F.3d at 827.  For example, in the LaVine case, the court 
recognized that the school’s emergency expulsion of a student that wrote a poem about a school 
shooting was reasonable.  LaVine, 257 F.3d at 985.  Because several school shootings had 
recently occurred in the surrounding area, school officials nationwide were on alert for any 
warning signs that might indicate potential violence in the school.  Id. at 984.  Based on this 
background, the court found that the actions taken by the school were reasonable.  Id. at 989.   
A.M. ex rel. McAllum v. Cash is another case where the court recognized that past disruption 
supported a policy of speech regulation.  585 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2009).  In this case, two students 
challenged a school policy that prohibited the display of the Confederate flag on school grounds.  
Id. at 217.  The girls were referred to the “administration for discipline” for carrying purses that 
displayed the Confederate flag.  Id.  The policy was enacted because of prior racial incidents at 
the school, some involving the Confederate flag.  Id. at 218.  Though the court found that the 
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purses did not cause any disruption, they held that the school’s policy was reasonable because 
school officials “reasonably anticipated” that display of the flag would cause “substantial 
disruption.”  Id. at 222.  The court recognized that the school policy was based on “ample, 
uncontroverted evidence” of past racial incidents.  Id.  Thus, the court upheld the policy despite 
the fact the purses did not cause any disruption.   
Similarly, the disciplinary actions of Murano High School are permissible because the school 
could reasonably forecast that the speech would lead to more disruption.  The material on the 
website was becoming increasingly offensive in content, leading to more complaints from 
students and parents.  R. 2.  Teachers were already having trouble maintaining control of their 
classrooms.  R. 15.  Since the content of the website had so quickly escalated to an inappropriate 
level, it was reasonable for the school district to assume that, if unrestrained, the conduct would 
rapidly continue to spiral out of control.  It is not necessary for Murano officials to wait for riots 
in the hallways to justify suspending Fernando.  Based on what had already occurred at the 
school, officials were justified in concluding that disciplinary action was reasonable to prevent 
future disruption.  Finally, school officials at Murano did not have to be certain that disruption 







First, Tinker and its progeny apply to student speech that is initiated off-campus.  The 
schoolhouse gate identified in Tinker is necessarily a flexible concept, and can no longer be 
defined solely by the physical boundaries of the school.  Through the use of cell phones and 
social networking websites, speech that may have been initiated off-campus doesn’t stay off-
campus for very long.  Tinker allows regulation of off-campus speech because it creates a 
balancing test to weigh the interests of the school against students’ right to free speech.  Using 
this test, student speech that negatively impacts the school environment will be subject to 
regulation.  The lower courts properly applied Tinker to Fernando’s speech because the speech 
had a sufficient and significant connection to the school. 
Next, Tinker and its progeny allow the school to regulate Fernando’s speech.  Under Tinker, 
a school may regulate speech that causes a material and substantial disruption in the school 
environment.  Tinker also allows schools to regulate speech prospectively; that is, school 
officials are not required to wait for a disruption to occur before prohibiting or regulating speech.  
If school officials can forecast that the speech will cause a disruption, it may be regulated.  Both 
of these apply to Fernando’s case.  Not only did the speech cause a material and substantial 
disruption, but also it was reasonable for school officials to conclude that his speech would 
continue to cause disruption if not properly restrained.  Accordingly, the school was justified in 
suspending Fernando until the offensive content is removed from the website.   
In sum, the decisions of the lower courts should be affirmed because Tinker applies to speech 
that is initiated off-campus.  Applying Tinker to this case shows that the speech was properly 
regulated because it did disrupt school activities and it was reasonable for school officials to 




For these reasons, Respondent prays the Court will affirm the lower court’s judgment and 
find that Murano High School authorities properly suspended Michael Fernando for his 
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